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NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v.
DUNLEVY REVISITED:
THE POWER OF A COURT TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION FOR THE
WRONG REASON

Wilfred J. Ritz*
Judgments can be divided into two classes: those that are valid
and those that are void.' Furthermore, according to Section 5 of the
Restatement of Judgments:
A judgment is void unless the State in which it is
rendered has jurisdiction to subject to its control the parties
2
or the property or status sought to be affected.
The bases of jurisdiction, it is to be noted, are stated in the alternative
-the parties or the property or the status. It is difficult to see how,
in any realistic sense, a court can control property or status, without
also having control over at least one of the parties, for some person
must act to bring the property or status under a court's control. It,
therefore, would be more accurate to say that a judgment is void
unless the state, that is, a court has subjected the parties, or at least
one party and the property, or at least one party and the status
to its control.
Suppose that a court should purport to exercise jurisdiction
on the theory that it has control over the parties, when in legal
contemplation it does not have jurisdiction over all of the parties,
but it does have jurisdiction over one of the parties and the property.
Is a judgment entered in such a proceeding valid or void? This was
the situation presented in the 1916 case of New York Life Insurance
Company v. Dunlevy, 3 although it was not discussed in these terms.
Suppose, again, that a court exercises jurisdiction on the theory
that it has control over three interested parties, when actually it
*A.B. Washington & Lee University; LL.B., University of Richmond; LL.M.
& S.J.D., Harvard University; Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University.
1. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 4, comment a (1942).
2. The requisites of a valid judgment are set forth in § 4 and include the
requirement that the judgment be rendered by a court with competency to
render it.
3.

241 U.S. 518 (1916).
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only has control over two parties. Is the judgment valid or void as
to the two parties that are subject to the court's control? This was
the situation presented in Hanson v. Denckla,4 although the basic
issue was obscured by a surfeit of discussion of the general subject
of jurisdiction.
In short, does a court have power to exercise jurisdiction for the
wrong reason?
Some light is thrown on the subject by the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Western Union Telegraph Company v. Pennsylvania,5 in which the Court reversed a Pennsylvania judgment 6
that had escheated to the state certain undelivered money orders
held by Western Union. The Court said:
And our prior opinions have recognized that when a state
court's jurisdiction purports to be based, as here, on the
presence of property within the State, the holder of such
property is deprived of due process of law if he is compelled
to relinquish it without assurance that he will not be held
liable again in another jurisdiction or in a suit brought by a
claimant who is not bound by the first judgment. 7
Due process of law could be satisfied, the Court said, by the state,
which is seeking to escheat these funds, invoking the United States
Supreme Court's constitutional jurisdiction over controversies between states. In this way the claims of the different states to escheat
intangibles can "be settled in a forum where all the States that want
to do so can present their claims for consideration and final, authorita8
tive determination."
The remedy so outlined in Western Union represents an indirect,
rather than a direct, approach to the problem the case undertakes
to solve. The problem is to find the state in which property, an intangible, is present or has a situs for purposes of escheat. 9 The
4.

357 U.S. 235 (1958).

5. 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
6. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 400
Pa. 337, 162 A.2d 617 (1960).

7. 368 U.S. at 75.
8. Id. at 79.
9. A discussion of intangibles in terms of situs, of course, involves the use
of a fiction. However, it seems to be the most convenient way to discuss the
subject, and the attribution of a situs to an intangible is well established both
in the cases and in legal literature. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF
LAws ch. 7 (1957): Property, Introductory Note, uses the word "thing" to
include both tangibles and Intangibles, and the "situs" of a thing is said to refer
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remedy offered is the binding of all claimants under the principle of
res judicata to a judgment that adjudicates the rights of the parties
in a proceeding in which the court has jurisdiction over all the
parties. 1 0
to the place where the thing is. See also EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 83
(1962); Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits Against Nonresident Claimants,
49 YALF, L.J. 241 (1939); Simmons, Conflict of Laws and Constitutional Law in
Respect to Intangibles, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 91 (1937).
10. The opinion in Western Union is not as clear as it might be as to the
role the Court envisions for itself in the settlement of escheat problems. This
ambiguity may have led Mr. Justice Stewart, while agreeing with the decision,
to remark that for him the opinion created "more problems than it solves."
368 U.S. at 80. There are two distinct possibilities.
The Court may be visualizing the adjudication of a limited number of suits
between states in which the entire problem of escheat will be explored and
authoritative rules laid down, which then can be applied by others without
further extensive participation by the Supreme Court itself. This approach bears
a strong resemblance to that taken to the problems of state taxation of intangibles
during the late 1920's and the 1930's. Then, the Court followed a single-tax ruleonly the state of the domicile of a decedent could impose an inheritance tax on
the decedent's intangible estate and other states could not do so. Farmers Loan
& Trust Co. v. State of Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930); First National Bank of
Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
The single-tax approach, though, soon broke down, and any state with some
reasonable relationship to the subject matter of the tax, and with the power to
make the tax effective, was permitted to tax intangibles. Curry v. McCanless, 307
U.S. 357 (1939); Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939); Graves v. Schmidlapp,
315 U.S. 657 (1942); State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174
(1942).
The adoption of uniform laws has mitigated the evils that followed abandonment of the single-tax rule. See Uniform Act of Interstate Arbitration of Death
Taxes, 9B U.L.A. 213 and Uniform Act on Interstate Compromise of Death Taxes,
9B U.L.A. 223. The cynic can find more than a superficial parallel between
problems of double state taxation and double state escheat of intangibles.
The other possibility is that the Court is envisioning its role as something
in the nature of a "supreme court of escheat." Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
discussion of the possibility of the U.S. Supreme Court becoming a court of probate and divorce. Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226, 233 (1945).
Under this approach the Court would actually adjudicate the escheat controversies arising among the states. While jurisdiction would be assumed in these
cases, the Court suggested that procedures might be developed for referring the
cases to the United States district courts for decision, at least in the first
instance. 368 U.S. at 79. The Court's strong reliance on the unique case of
Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939), also indicates the Court is thinking in
terms of actual adjudication of run-of-the-mill escheat cases.
In his opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Black said that the Western Union
situation was "in all material respects like that which caused us to take jurisdiction in Texas v. Florida." 368 U.S. at 77. In making this statement, the
Justice ignored the fact that in Texas v. Florida the total tax claims of the states
and the federal government exceeded the net estate of the decedent. This meant
that there were not sufficient assets to satisfy all claimants. The Justice left
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Western Union announces a new and unique doctrine, which, if
extended into ordinary civil litigation virtually abolishes the exercise of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, since it denies that jurisdiction can ever be exercised unless all interested partes are bound
by the judgment."
Under traditional doctrines of jurisdiction, as they have operated
in the United States under the full faith and credit clause of the
federal constitution, the jurisdictional fact on which Pennsylvania
acted, presence of the funds within the state, is open to re-examination and re-determination in another proceeding by anyone not bound
by the Pennsylvania proceeding. This is the teaching of a whole
series of cases, notably Thompson v. Whitman' 2 and Williams v.
North Carolina I.1 3 If New York later seeks to escheat the same
property, New York may impeach the Pennsylvania judgment by
showing that the property was not present in Pennsylvania at the
time of the Pennsylvania proceeding. Of course, Western Union can
undertake to defend the Pennsylvania judgment by showing that the
property was present in that state, and so Pennsylvania did have
jurisdiction and its judgment is valid and binding on New York, by
reason of the full faith and credit clause, even though New York was
not a party to the Pennsylvania proceeding.
Since different courts may place the situs of the same intangible
in different states, this opens the way to double escheat. The potentiality for this double liability imposed by a double escheat was
limited somewhat by the United States Supreme Court in Standard
Oil Company v. New Jersey,' in which the Court gave its blessing
to a race of diligence by the states to obtain the first "valid judguncited and unexplained the cases in which the Supreme Court refused to take
jurisdiction, the tax claims not exceeding the amount of the net estate. New
Jersey v. Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 580 (1932); Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1
(1939). Insofar as the opinion shows, there was no allegation in Western Union
that the escheat claims of the states exceeded the total assets of Western Union.
Consequently, in this significant respect, Western Union goes much beyond Texas
v. Florida.
11. The funds in the possession of Western Union presumably are subject
to escheat by some state. Consequently, it is one thing to say, as Western
Union does, that New York's claim to be the situs of funds "could not be cut off
where New York was not heard as a party," 368 U.S. at 75, and quite a different
thing to say that Pennsylvania has no jurisdiction to escheat funds having a situs
in Pennsylvania, simply because New York, another claimant, was not a party to
the proceeding.
12. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1874).
13. 325 U.S. 226 (1945). See also RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 11, comment c, and § 12 (1942).
14.

341 U.S. 428 (1951).
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ment."1 5 But Standard Oil did not modify the Thompson v. Whitman
rule under which a second state could show that no valid judgment
of escheat had been obtained in the first state. Western Union modifies these holdings since it requires the presence of all interested
states in an escheat proceeding, so that double escheat is barred
because the court has jurisdiction over all the interested parties,
rather than jurisdiction over one party and the property. Double
escheat is barred because only an in personam judgment is recognized
as valid, the exercise of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction being
eliminated.
It will be interesting to see whether this same approach is extended
to the problem of double taxation, as illustrated by the familiar
Dorrance litigation.' 6
The most certain solution for the problem of potential double liability, whether escheat, taxation, or some other subject is involved,
is to get all of the interested parties before the same court so that
15. The Court said, "The debts or demands . . . having been taken from the
appellant company by a valid judgment of New Jersey, the same debts or demands against appellant [Standard Oil] cannot be taken by another State. The
Full Faith and Credit Clause bars any such double escheat." Id. at 443. The full
faith and credit clause would not bar double escheat by an American state and a
foreign country. But see Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1952).
16. In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303 (1932); New Jersey
v. Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 580 (1932); In re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268,
170 Atl. 601; 116 N.J. Eq. 204, 172 Atl. 503 (Prerogative Ct. 1934), afj'd mem.,
Dorrance v. Martin, 13 N.J. Misc. 168, 176 Atl. 902 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd mere.,
116 N.J.L. 362, 184 Atl. 743 (1936), cart. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1936); Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935). Among the law review discussions of the case are Tweed
and Sargent, Death and Taxes are Certain-But What of Domicile, 53 HARV. L.
REV. 68 (1939); Harper, Final Determination of Domicil in the United States, 9
IND. L.J. 586 (1934) reprinted from 19 PA. BAR Q. 213 (1934); Note, Dorrance's
Estate: Conflicting Adjudications of Domicil, 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 177 (1932). See
also State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Worcester
County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937); Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308
U.S. 1 (1939).
Double state taxation can be rationalized on the basis that more than one
state can exact a tax on the same subject matter, because more than one
state has conferred a benefit. It only requires a little stretch of the imagination
to extend the same logic to escheat-more than one state may escheat specific
property because each state has conferred a benefit with reference to the
property. In the escheat of intangibles, as in Western Union, the property to be
escheated is not specifically identifiable, as chattels are. In recognition of this, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania based its jurisdiction to escheat on personal
jurisdiction over the Western Union Company. The principal distinction between
escheat and taxation must be founded on some theory that in escheat the whole
of the property is taken by the state, while in taxation the state does not take
any specific property, but only a part of the value of the whole.
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they will all be bound by a single judicial determination. This solution is not of recent origin, but the basic problem continues to be
how to accomplish this result. The Western Union case finds a solution insofar as the problem of double escheat is involved in the grant
of the federal constitution to the United States Supreme Court of
jurisdiction over controversies between states. 1 7 The constitutional
grant to the federal judiciary of jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different states provides the basis for a solution of
an earlier problem of double liability.' 8 This was the double liability
imposed in New York Life Insurance Company v. Dunlevy, 1 9 which
also grew out of litigation originating in Pennsylvania, and led to the
adoption of the first Federal Interpleader Act. 2 0 Even so, the potentialities of a federal system of courts to handle problems arising from
controversies between citizens of different states have only been
partially realized. 21
This paper will re-examine the Dunlevy case, in the light of some
of the developments that have occurred since 1916 and which culminated in the Western Union decision, with a view to determining
whether there may not be available some view of the complex subject
of jurisdiction that will deny double liability on the Dunlevy facts
without the necessity of resorting to the use of federal judiciary. In
1957, in pursuit of this goal the Supreme Court of California in
Atkinson v. Superior Court,2 2 relying particularly upon International
Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,23 questioned whether the Dunlevy
case would still be followed. It will, therefore, be useful, first, to consider the facts of New York Life Insurance Company v. Dunlevy. 21
In 1889, New York Life Insurance Company issued a $5,000 life
insurance policy to Joseph W. Gould, 2 5 which after being in force
17.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.

18.

Ibid.

19. 241 U.S. 518 (1916). For other cases of double liability see CHAFFEE,
Interstate Interpleader,33 YALE L.J. 685, 714 n.102, 718 n.120 (1924).
20. Act of February 22, 1717, ch. 113, 39 STAT. 929. For the present statute
see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1958). For development leading up to the
adoption of the Act see Chaffee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 YALE L. J. 814
(1921).
21. See Ritz, Migratory Alimony: A Constitutional Dilemma in the Exercise
of in Personam Jurisdiction,29 FORDHAM L. REV. 83 (1960), for a discussion of
the potentialities in one area.
22. 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
23.

326 U.S. 310 (1945).

24. 241 U.S. 518 (1916), affIrming 214 Fed. 1 (9th Cir. 1914), affirming 204
Fed. 670 (N.D. Calif. 1913).
25. The circuit court referred to this as a tontine policy. 214 Fed. at 3. The
Supreme Court said that "the tontine dividend period" of the life policy having ex-
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twenty years was said to have a cash surrender value of $2,479.70.
In accordance with the rules of the company, in 1893 Gould made an
assignment of the policy to his thirteen-year old daughter, Effie. It
was this assignment that later became the subject of controversy,
the daughter, now Mrs. Dunlevy, claiming that it was absolute, and
carried the right to this cash surrender value, while Gould claimed
that the assignment was limited, and gave the daughter only the
right to the death benefits. It is not clear from the opinions whether
the policy had "matured" so a liability in the amount of $2,479.70
had become fixed, or whether the "owner" of the policy had to take
affirmative action to reach the cash surrender value.
In 1907, while the daughter was still a resident of Pennsylvania,
Boggs & Buhl recovered a valid judgment 2 6 against her in a Pennsylvania state court. In November 1909, after the daughter, Mrs.
Dunlevy, had become a resident of California, Boggs & Buhl learned
of the assignment and cash surrender value of the policy. They
caused execution to issue on the 1907 judgment, seeking to reach this
in satisfaction of the judgment.
The writ of execution was served on the local agent of the insurance
company and upon Gould, but not on Mrs. Dunlevy. Gould appeared
and denied the assignment, claiming the cash surrender value for
himself. Before the insurance company answered, Mrs. Dunlevy, on
January 14, 1910, instituted her own action against the insurance
company in a California state court, claiming the cash surrender
value. Thereafter, when the insurance company answered in the
Pennsylvania proceeding, it admitted indebtedness on the policy and
set up the conflicting claims of Gould and Mrs. Dunlevy. When other
creditors of Mrs. Dunlevy levied additional garnishments, the insurance company asked the Pennsylvania state court for leave to pay
the money into court and to interplead the various claimants for the
purpose of determining their respective rights. The request was
granted. The court directed that personal notice of the proceeding
should be given to Mrs. Dunlevy in California, which was done, but
she did not appear. The other parties having appeared, the court
pired, the company became liable for $2,479.70. 241 U.S. at 519-20. The district
court referred to "the cash surrender value accrued under the tontine provisions."
204 Fed. at 671. Chaffee, who examined the record and briefs, refers to the policy
as being an endowment policy that had matured. Chaffee, Interstate Interpleader,
33 YALE L.J. 685, 711 (1924).
26. The amount of this judgment is not set forth in the opinions. Chaffee
says the judgment was for about $500. Chaffee, Interstate Interpleader, 33 YALE
L.J. 685, 712 (1924).
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directed the framing of a "feigned issue" 2 7 to obtain a jury determination regarding the assignment of the policy. This was done and
the jury returned a verdict that no assignment had been made and
that Gould was entitled to the fund. Thereafter, the court directed
payment to Gould.
The insurance company removed Mrs. Dunlevy's California suit to
a federal court, wherein it relied upon the Pennsylvania proceeding
as a defense. The defense was overruled and the federal district court
entered judgment in favor of Mrs. Dunlevy for the cash surrender
value of the policy, a judgment which was affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. Thus,
New York Life Insurance Company was subjected to double liability
on this insurance policy. Each of the federal courts found that this
result was required, but gave somewhat differing reasons for their
conclusions.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Gilbert,
assumed that the Pennsylvania proceeding was quasi in rem to determine ownership of a fund of money in custody of the court. It examined a Pennsylvania Act of April 6, 1859, authorizing such proceedings, 28 and found that the statute had not been complied with.
The notice given to Mrs. Dunlevy had not fixed a time period within
which she was to appear, as required by the statute, but instead
directed her to answer by February 26. Since notice was not served
on her until February 18, this meant she only had eight days to
appear, although under Pennsylvania law, if served within the state,
she would have been given ten days. While Circuit Judge Gilbert
couched his opinion as to the reason for the invalidity of the Pennsylvania judgment in terms of noncompliance with the Pennsylvania
statute, a preferable and more tenable ground 2 9 would have been to
base the result squarely on a denial of the notice and opportunity
27. The technique of a "feigned issue" was used in England by the Court of
Chancery to obtain a finding of fact by a jury in the Court of King's Bench. It is
also said to have been frequently used in courts of law, by consent of the parties,
to determine some disputed right without the formality of pleading, thereby saving
much time and expense in the decision of the cause. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § 452.
28. This statute, of course, predates the fourteenth amendment, so that at
the time of its enactment and for some years thereafer, there was no question
of its validity under the federal constitution. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250
(1958). This does not mean, however, that a federal court sitting in Pennsylvania
in a diversity case would necessarily have applied the statute, or that a judgment
based on the statute would have been enforced in another state, the full faith
and credit clause notwithstanding.
29. See Ritz, Should Utah Courts Review Judgments of Illinois Courts on
Questions of Illinois Law?, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 62 (1961).
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to be heard required by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Consequently, the same result should be reached today
on the precise facts of the Dunlevy case.
Both the district court and the Supreme Court, though, proceeded
upon a rationale that would have upheld double liability even though
the Pennsylvania law had been fully complied with and Mrs. Dunlevy
had been given adequate notice and full opportunity to be heard. It
is this reasoning that merits further examination.
In the district court, Judge Van Fleet took the view that the garnishment and interpleader proceedings were independent of each
other. Since there was a valid unsatisfied judgment against Mrs.
Dunlevy, the Pennsylvania court had acquired judisdiction over her
in the garnishment proceeding to determine, as between her and
Boggs & Buhl, whether she had any property in Pennsylvania, including debts owing to her, that could be used to satisfy the judgment. 3 0 In the interpleader proceeding, however, the Pennsylvania
court did not acquire jurisdiction over either the person of Mrs. Dunlevy or any property of hers, and so she was not bound by the proceeding. Judge Van Fleet said:
A court must, to render an effectual judgment, have jurisdiction either of the person of the defendant or the res. Pennoyer v. Neff, supra. The judgment of the court of common
pleas itself determines that it had no jurisdiction of the
latter, since it is adjudged that the debt levied upon, and
which alone would give it jurisdiction, was not the debt of
plaintiff, but of a third party, as against whom the creditors
of plaintiff had no rights. 3 1
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds, agreed with the district court that the garnishment and
interpleader proceedings were distinct, and that while Pennsylvania
had jurisdiction over Mrs. Dunlevy for the garnishment, it did not
have jurisdiction for the interpleader and so that proceeding was not
binding upon her. In the course of his opinion Mr. Justice McReynolds
said:
Beyond doubt, without the necessity of further personal service of process upon Mrs. Dunlevy, the court of
common pleas at Pittsburgh had ample power through garnshment proceedings to inqure whether she held a valid
30. The court cited Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Harris v. Balk,
198 U.S. 215 (1905); and Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Deer, 200 U.S.
176 (1906).
31. 204 Fed. at 674. (Emphasis added.)
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claim against the insurance company, and, if found to exist,
then to condemn and appropriate it so far as necessary to
discharge the original judgment. Although herself outside
the limits of the state, such disposition of the property
would have been binding on her. 3 2
Considerable controversy has developed as to whether interpleader
can be treated as an in rem proceeding or whether it must be characterized as in personam, so that personal jurisdiction must be had
over a claimant to bind him to the judgment in the interpleader proceeding. 3 3 The Dunlevy case is generally understood to establish
that:
...
a person against whom in personam liability is asserted
may not transform that liability into a res by depositing
money into court and thus enable the court to proceed to an
adjudication, by in rem or quasi in rem process, of the de34
fendants' in personam claims against the plaintiff.
Whatever might be the result in other cases, it is difficult to see
on the facts of Dunlevy how Mrs. Dunlevy could have been prejudiced by treating the interpleader as a quasi in rem proceeding. If
she was not entitled to the policy proceeds she suffered no injustice, and if she was entitled to them, admittedly they could
have been taken to the extent necessary to satisfy the judgment
against her. In either event, she would not have received the pro35
ceeds.
However this may be, the argument of this paper is based on the
premise that double liability in the Dunlevy case should have been
barred, even though it is accepted that interpleader is purely in personam and the Pennsylvania court was wrong in treating it as quasi
in rem.
Since the United States Supreme Court, as well as the district court,
took the view that if the Pennsylvania court had found that Gould had
made an absolute assignment to his daughter, the cash surrender
value of the policy would have been a claim located in Pennsylvania
that could have been condemned and appropriated to the judgment
creditor's claim, the finding of the federal court in California that
the claim did belong to Mrs. Dunlevy established a sound basis for
32.
33.
34.

241 U.S. at 520.
33 YALE L.J. 685 (1924).
3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §22.06 (2d ed. 1948).
35. It is not clear whether Mrs. Dunlevy would have obtained any of the
proceeds, if the Pensylvania court had found that an assignment had been made
to her. Although the Boggs & Buhl judgment is said to have been only for $500,
other creditors also tried to garnish the proceeds.

1964]

NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY V. DUNLEVY

35

the exercise of jurisdiction by Pennsylvania. Judge Van Fleet did
not follow his own reasoning to its logical conclusion. True, assuming that a claim owned by either Gould or Mrs. Dunlevy was involved,
when the Pennsylvania court found that the intangible belonged to
Gould it had necessarily also found that there was no intangible in
Pennsylvania belonging to Mrs. Dunlevy, and so Pennsylvania had
no more jurisdiction to enter a quasi in rem judgment than a personal
judgment binding on Mrs. Dunlevy. But to paraphrase Judge Van
Fleet, just as the judgment of the Pennsylvania court determined
that the Pennsylvania court had no jurisdiction, so Judge Van Fleet's
finding in the second suit in California that Mrs. Dunlevy did own
the claim was a determination that the Pennsylvania court did have
jurisdiction.
It is familiar learning that the judgment of a court with jurisdiction is not subject to collateral attack, even though the judgment may
have been wrong. 3 6 The worst then that can be said of the Pennsylvania judgment, in light of the later finding in California that Mrs.
Dunlevy owned an intangible that was situated in Pennsylvania at
the time of the Pennsylvania proceeding, is that the Pennsylvania
court exercised jurisdiction for the wrong reason.
Developments in the law relating to jurisdiction have eliminated
clear cut distinctions between the exercise of in personam and in rem
jurisdiction. This was illustrated in Hanson v. Denckla 3 7 in which
the United States Supreme Court considered whether a Florida judgment was entitled to recognition in Delaware because it represented a
valid exercise by Florida of in rem jurisdiction, or alternatively, because it represented valid in personam action. It was pointed out that
a stronger case could be made out, for the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction, on the basis of cases such as McGee v. InternationalLife
Ins. Co., 3 8 than for the exercise of an in rem jurisdiction.3 9
Something in the nature of an imperfect merger of in rem, including quasi in rem, and in personam jurisdiction has been effected when
the presence of property within a jurisdiction, which supports the
36. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S.
183 (1947); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining
Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 11, comment b (1942).
37. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
38. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
39. The majority, In an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, denied the
power of Florida to exercise jurisdiction on either basis. Three justices, In an
opinion by Mr. Justice Black, thought that Florida could exercise jurisdiction on
an in personam basis. Mr. Justice Douglas, without expressly saying so, indicated
he would have supported Florida's jurisdiction on an in rem basis.
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exercise of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction, is in and of itself taken
to be the "minimum contact" that supports in personam jurisdiction
under the InternationalShoe doctrine. The broad jurisdictional states
recognize "ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated"
40
within a state as the basis for exercise of in personam jurisdiction.
Is there any reason why possession of real estate should be considered
sufficient to give judicial jurisdiction, while "possession" of an intangible is not?
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws (Second) goes even further
and says that ownership of a thing, defined as either a tangible or
intangible, 4 1 within a state is sufficient to give a state in personam
jurisdiction over an individual as to any cause of action arising out
of the thing "within limitations of a reasonableness appropriate to
'4 2 Is a
the relationship derived from the ownership of the thing."
thing any the less owned because more than one person is claiming
to be the owner? In fact, the Dunlevy view of interpleader notwithstanding, the existence of conflicting claims as to ownership would
seem to increase the reasonableness of the situs of the intangible
adjudicating those claims.
It is this tendency to merge that led the Supreme Court of California in Atkinson v. Superior Court4 3 to question whether the Dunlevy case is still good law. In Atkinson a group of employees attacked
the validity of a collective bargaining contract made between their
employers and a union under which certain royalties were being paid
to a New York trustee. The employees were seeking to have the
agreement invalidated, as being in breach of the union's duty as a
collective bargaining agent, and the payments made to them as
wages. The question presented was whether a California court could
acquire sufficient jurisdiction over the New York trustee so as to
settle the controversy. The obligation of the employer to make the
payments, either to the trustee or the employees, was recognized as
an intangible without any definite situs. The plaintiff-employees,
relying on the garnishment and escheat cases, 4 4 argued that this

intangible was in California, so that a court within the state had
jurisdiction to cut off the nonresident trustee's claim to it. The defendants, however, argued that the jurisdiction recognized in garnishment and escheat cases existed only when it was admitted that
40.

E.g., 2 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110 § 17 (1959).

41.

Supra note 4.

42.

Section 84a.

43. 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
44. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey,
341 U.S. 428 (1951); Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
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the nonresident owned the intangible property, and, pointing to the
Dunlevy case, argued that such jurisdiction did not exist when the
question presented was whether or not the nonresident owned the
property. The Supreme Court of California refused to recognize the
relevancy of such a distinction, but instead relied on the International
Shoe doctrine as supporting a view that a state can exercise a quasi
in rem jurisdiction, as well as personal jurisdiction, without violating
the due process clause, whenever there are sufficient minimum contacts of the transaction with the state. Finding that such contacts
did exist in the case, the court distinguished Dunlevy and upheld the
exercise of jurisdiction of the California court to determine the rights
of the employees and the New York trustee with reference to the
payments owing by the employers. In referring to the Dunlevy case,
the court said:
It is doubtful whether today the United States Supreme
Court would deny to a state court the interstate interpleader
jurisdiction that federal courts may exercise. A remedy that
a federal court may provide without violating due process of
law does not become unfair or unjust because it is sought
45
in a state court instead.
It is difficult to agree that whatever the federal courts can do, the
state courts can do, in the exercise of jurisdiction. Such a view ignores the nature of the federal system, and, in effect, denies that the
federal judiciary can serve a unique function in resolving problems
of double liability. It must be admitted, though, that the broadening
of the bases of in personam jurisdiction has gone far towards giving
the state courts a nationwide jurisdiction, and that there is no reason
of substance to create an exception thereto and deny to them jurisdiction in interpleader proceedings. However, it is not necessary to
resort to either the federal judiciary or to give state judiciaries a
nationwide jurisdiction in order to deny double liability in situations
such as presented in the Dunlevy case.
The facts of Dunlevy are the converse of the situation most frequently met. Ordinarily, the second court denies effect to the judgment of the first court, because, upon re-examination the second court
finds that the jurisdictional facts did not exist that would have permitted the first court to enter a valid judgment. Thus in Williams
v. North Carolina11,4 6 the court in North Carolina re-examined the
45. 316 P.2d at 966. But see Hobbs v. Lewis, 197 Tenn. 44, 270 S.W.2d 352
(1954) and Lewis v. Hogwood, 300 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1962), holding that
Tennessee will not exercise jurisdiction over a trust located outside the state.
46.

325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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question of domicile, and found that the defendant had not acquired
a bona fide domicile in Nevada, even though the Nevada court had
found he did acquire such a bona fide domicile, and so Nevada had no
jurisdiction to grant a divorce that was entitled to recognition in
North Carolina under the full faith and credit clause.4 7 In Dunlevy,
on the other hand, the second court found that, contrary to the view
of the first court, the jurisdictional fact did exist. The first court had
exercised jurisdiction for what the second court thought was the
wrong reason.
Double liability in Dunlevy would have been denied by recognition
that the judgment of a court exercising jurisdiction for the wrong
reason is valid. Such a rule provides a useful basis for reasoning in
the somewhat analogous situation presented in Hanson v. Denckz. 4 8
In this case the Florida court erroneously thought that it had personal jurisdiction over a nonresident trustee. The United States
Supreme Court indicated that it would have been constitutional for
Florida to have exercised jurisdiction binding upon the parties over
whom it did have personal jurisdiction, if Florida law had been that
the trustee was not an indispensable party to such a proceeding.
Since the United States Supreme Court found that Florida law was
that the trustee was an indispensable party, the Court denied any
res judicata effect to the Florida judgment as it related to the parties
before the Florida court. It thus appears that the Florida court had
constitutional jurisdiction over the parties before it, but exercised
that jurisdiction for the wrong reason. If the judgment of a court
exercising jurisdiction for the wrong reason is recognized as valid,
the Florida judgment would be binding on the parties actually before
the Florida court.
The rule advocated by this article is: A judgment is valid if the
court entering the judgment has jurisdiction, even though it exercises jurisdiction for the wrong reason.
47. The decision did not determine whether the Nevada divorce was valid
in Nevada; similarly, the Dunlevy case did not determine whether the Pennsylvania judgment was valid in Pennsylvania.
48.
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